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Abstract
In network coding, information transmission often encounters wiretapping attacks. Secure network
coding is introduced to prevent information from being leaked to adversaries. For secure linear network
codes (SLNCs), the required field size is a very important index, because it largely determines the
computational and space complexities of a SLNC, and it is also very important for the process of secure
network coding from theoretical research to practical application. In this letter, we further discuss the
required field size of SLNCs, and obtain a new lower bound. This bound shows that the field size of
SLNCs can be reduced further, and much smaller than the known results for almost all cases.
Index Terms
Secure network coding, field size, security-level.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the paradigm of network coding, when wiretapping attacks occur, that is, an eavesdropper has
capability of wiretapping on an unknown channel-set in networks, secure network coding is introduced
to prevent information from being leaked to adversaries. This was first proposed by Cai and Yeung in
[1]. In their recent paper [2], they proposed the model of a communication system on a wiretap network
(CSWN) and a construction of secure linear network codes (SLNCs) to guarantee that the eavesdropper
can obtain no information about the source message and meanwhile all sink nodes as legal users can
decode the source message with zero error. Particularly, if the eavesdropper can obtain nothing about
the source message by accessing any r channels, we say that this SLNC achieves the security-level r.
Subsequently, Rouayheb et al. [3] showed that this model can be regarded as a network generalization
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of the wiretap channel II and presented another construction of SLNCs by applying secure codes for
wiretap channel II. Motivated by Rouayheb et al.s’ formulation [3], Silva and Kschischang [4] studied
the universal secure network coding via rank-metric codes, that is, the design of linear network codes
for message transmission and the design of security against an eavesdropper can be completely separated
from each other. For any construction of SLNCs, the required alphabet size or the size of base finite
field, is very important, because it largely determines the complexities of constructions including space
and computational complexities, and further efficiency of network transmission. This index is also very
important for the process of secure network coding from theoretical research to practical applications.
However, the existing results show that these constructions require very large field size, which leads
to inefficiency in general. In [5], Feldman et al. derived tradeoffs between security, code alphabet, and
information rate of SLNCs, which indicated that if we give up a part of overall capacity, we may use a
field of smaller size. This tradeoff can be also obtained from [2] as mentioned in their paper.
Motivated by the importance of field size, in this letter, we further explore the required field size for
SLNCs, and give a new lower bound. This bound shows that the field size can be reduced considerably
further by applying network topologies without giving up any part of capacity. This is benefit to the
implementation of SLNCs in possible applications. To be specific, by observing the constructions of
SLNCs in [2]–[4], we introduce a useful equivalence relation in networks, and the number of equivalence
classes induced by this equivalence relation is sufficient for the construction of SLNCs. Finally, an example
is illustrated to compare our result with the previous.
II. THE FIELD SIZE OF SLNCS
A. Related Works
First, we state the construction proposed by Cai and Yeung [2] for designing an ω-rate and r-security-
level SLNC on a single source multicast network G with unit capacity channels. In addition, Rouayheb
et al. [3] proposed another construction and indicated that their construction is actually equivalent to Cai
and Yeung’s.
Construction:
Step 1: For the information rate ω and security-level r with n , ω + r ≤ Cmin = min
all sinks t
Ct with Ct
being the minimum cut capacity between the single source s and the sink t, construct an n-dimensional
Fq-valued linear network code (LNC) Cn of global encoding kernels ~fe, e ∈ E, (e.g. Jaggi et al.’s
algorithm [6]);
Step 2: Choose n linearly independent column vectors ~b1, ~b2, · · · , ~bn ∈ Fnq satisfying the secure
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condition:
〈~bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω〉 ∩ 〈~fe : e ∈ A〉 = {0}
1 (1)
for all channel-subsets A ∈ E of cardinalities no larger than r. Then define an n × n invertible matrix
Q =
[
~b1 ~b2 · · · ~bn
]
.
Step 3: The source message M is randomly chosen from Fωq and the independent random key K is
distributed uniformly on Frq, both of which are generated only at the source. Let an ω-row vector ~m ∈ Fωq
and an r-row vector ~k ∈ Frq be the outcomes of M and K, respectively. Thus ~x = (~m, ~k) is the input
of the network, and then send the pre-encoded input ~x ·Q−1 through the network by using the LNC Cn.
This construction designs an ω-rate and r-security-level SLNC. Actually, {Q−1 · ~fe : e ∈ E} constitutes
a global description of this SLNC. Evidently, the secure condition (1) must be qualified for all A ⊆ E
of cardinalities no larger than r if it is qualified for those A ⊆ E with |A| = r. Hence, we just need to
consider the number of channel-sets A of cardinality r, equal to
(
|E|
r
)
. Hence, we give Cai and Yeung’s
conclusion [2] on the required field size below.
Theorem 1: A Fq-valued SLNC with rate ω and security-level r can be constructed provided that
|Fq| = q ≥
(
|E|
r
)
.
2
B. Our Contributions
By further observing the secure condition (1), we found that it is sufficient to consider those channel-sets
A ⊆ E satisfying |A| = Rank(FA) = r with FA =
[
~fe : e ∈ A
]
, since for any channel-set A′ ⊆ E with
|A′| = r but Rank(FA′) < r, we can always find a channel-set A ⊆ E satisfying |A| = Rank(FA) = r
such that LA′ ⊂ LA, where LB = 〈~fe : e ∈ B〉 for arbitrary channel-set B. Hence, we define a collection
E˜r consisting of all such A as:
E˜r , {A ⊆ E : |A| = Rank(FA) = r}.
The above observation implies that the required field size can be reduced to |E˜r|. However, notice that
E˜r depends on the underlying LNC and so it is hard to handle. Naturally, we hope to find another
1Let L represent a collection of vectors in some linear space, and then we use 〈L〉 to denote the subspace spanned by vectors
in L for convenience. In addition, we always use 0 to denote all zero column vectors throughout this letter, whose dimensions
will always be clear from the context.
2Actually, as shown in [6], for the LIF algorithm, a field of size larger than or equal to (|E|
r
)
is sufficient for guaranteeing
the existence of SLNCs.
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lower bound on the field size just depending on network topologies. Thus, we define a new collection of
channel-sets as:
E˜cutr , {A ⊆ E : |A| = mincut(s,A) = r}, (2)
where mincut(s,A) represents the minimum cut capacity between s and A, and clearly E˜cutr just depends
on the network topology. We first interpret some concepts just mentioned or to be used in the following.
Again let G = (V,E) be a finite acyclic directed network with unit capacity channels and the single
source s, and let A ⊆ E be a channel-set in G. At first, we define a cut between s and A in G. In the
network G, install a new node tA, and for every edge e ∈ A, add a new edge e′ connected from tail(e)
to the new node tA and meanwhile delete the edge e from G. A cut between s and tA is regarded as a
cut between s and A in G, but it is necessary to mention that if a cut separating s and tA contains some
edges in In(tA), then they should be replaced by the corresponding edges in A. Further, the minimum
cut capacity between s and A is defined as the minimum cut capacity between s and tA, and the cuts
separating s and A achieving this minimum cut capacity are called the minimum cuts. Now, we can
obtain the following proposition easily, which implies that the size of E˜cutr can be regarded as a new
lower bound.
Proposition 1: E˜r ⊆ E˜cutr , and |E˜r| ≤ |E˜cutr | ≤
(|E|
r
)
.
Thus, we can obtain our first conclusion.
Theorem 2: A Fq-valued SLNC with rate ω and security-level r can be constructed provided that
|Fq| = q ≥ |E˜
cut
r |.
As we mentioned above, what we are concerned are those vector spaces spanned by global encoding
kernels ~fe, e ∈ A, i.e., LA = 〈~fe : e ∈ A〉 for all A ∈ E˜r, or further all A ∈ E˜cutr . Furthermore, notice a
fact that in linear network coding, for any channel-set A, all global encoding kernels of channels in A
are linear combinations of those global encoding kernels of channels in any cut CUT separating s and
A. This subsequently means that LA must be a subspace of LCUT. Particularly, if A ∈ E˜cutr and CUT is
a minimum cut between s and A, then LA ⊆ LCUT. Thus, the number of different vector spaces amongst
all vector spaces LA for all A ∈ E˜r or A ∈ E˜cutr is enough for the above Construction. Motivated by
this observation, it is necessary to continue discussing the required finite field in order to reduce its size.
First, notice the following fact that LA = LA′ for any two channel-sets A,A′ ∈ E˜r provided that A and
A′ have a common minimum cut. In addition, similar to what we indicated before, we still want to find
a lower bound on the field size just depending on network topologies. Hence the following discussion is
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given. At first we define a relation “mcut∼ ” between arbitrary two channel-sets A and A′ in E˜cutr :
A
mcut
∼ A′ (3)
if and only if A and A′ have a common minimum cut between the source node s and them. The theorem
below shows the relation “mcut∼ ” in E˜cutr being an equivalence relation.
Theorem 3: The relation “mcut∼ ” is an equivalence relation. Equivalently, the following three properties
are qualified for all channel-sets A,A′, A′′ ∈ E˜cutr :
1) (Reflexivity) A mcut∼ A;
2) (Symmetry) if A mcut∼ A′ then A′ mcut∼ A;
3) (Transitivity) if A mcut∼ A′ and A′ mcut∼ A′′, A mcut∼ A′′.
The reflexivity and symmetry of the relation “mcut∼ ” are obvious. To show transitivity, we need two
lemmas below.
Lemma 4: Let G = (V,E) be a finite acyclic directed network with unit capacity channels and the
single source s. Let t be a non-source node and the minimum cut capacity between s and t be r. Then
arbitrary r edge-disjoint paths from s to t pass through all minimum cuts between s and t, and r distinct
edges in each minimum cut are on r distinct paths respectively.
Proof: Assume the contrary that there exists a minimum cut CUT between s and t such that there
is an edge e ∈ CUT on none of r paths. Note that CUT is minimum, and so |CUT| = mincut(s, t) = r,
which shows that all edges in CUT are on r− 1 edge-disjoint paths at most. Thus, there must exist one
path passing through no edges in CUT. This further implies that after deleting all edges in CUT from
the network G, there still exists an path from s to t, which conflicts with the assumption that CUT is a
cut between s and t.
For any two edges ei and ej in a directed acyclic network, if a path from ei to ej can be found, then
we say that ei is previous to ej , denoted by ei ≺ ej . Particularly, we set e ≺ e for every edge e. This is
a natural and conventional partial order in directed acyclic networks.
Lemma 5: Let G = (V,E) be a finite acyclic directed network with unit capacity channels and the
single source s, and let t be a non-source node of the minimum cut capacity r from s. Further let
P1, P2, · · · , Pr be r edge-disjoint paths from s to t, and CUT1 = {e1,i : 1 ≤ i ≤ r} and CUT2 = {e2,i :
1 ≤ i ≤ r} be two minimum cuts between s and t with ej,i on the path Pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, j = 1, 2.
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Define an edge-set CUT = {minord(e1,i, e2,i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ r}, where
minord(e1,i, e2,i) =


e1,i, e1,i ≺ e2,i,
e2,i, otherwise.
Then CUT is still a minimum cut between s and t.
Proof: First, since |CUT| = r = mincut(s, t), CUT must be a minimum cut between s and t
provided that it is a cut between them. Hence, we will just show that CUT is a cut between s and t.
Two cases below are discussed.
Case 1. If minord(e1,i, e2,i) = e1,i (resp. e2,i), i.e., e1,i ≺ e2,i (resp. e2,i ≺ e1,i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then
the result of the theorem is trivial.
Case 2. Otherwise, assume the contrary that CUT is no longer a cut between s and t. Then there must
exist a path P from s to t which doesn’t pass through CUT. But this path P has to pass through the
minimum cut CUT1 from Lemma 4, and let e1,i1 in CUT1 be the channel passed through by P . Then
we can claim that e1,i1 ≻ e2,i1 . Conversely, if e1,i1 ≺ e2,i1 then minord(e1,i1 , e2,i1) = e1,i1 ∈ CUT ∩ P ,
which leads to a contradiction. Further, we replace the part from e1,i1 to t in P by the part from e1,i1
to t in Pi1 , and keep the remaining part in P , i.e., the part from s to e1,i1 , unchanged. Then we derive
a new path denoted by P (1). It is easy to check that P (1) doesn’t pass through CUT either, since none
of the parts from s to e1,i1 in P and from e1,i1 to t in Pi1 pass through CUT.
Now, we claim that the sub-path from s to e1,i1 of P (1) must pass through the minimum cut CUT2.
Since the part from e1,i1 to t in P (1) (the same as the corresponding part in Pi1) cannot pass through
CUT2 from e1,i1 ≻ e2,i1 , the path P (1) would not pass through CUT2 provided that its sub-path from s
to e1,i1 doesn’t pass through CUT2. This contradicts to Lemma 4. Thus, assume that the sub-path from s
to e1,i1 of P (1) passes through e2,i2 in CUT2, and similarly, e2,i2 ≻ e1,i2 , otherwise minord(e1,i2 , e2,i2) =
e2,i2 ∈ P
(1) ∩ CUT yielding a contradiction. We further replace the part from e2,i2 to t in P (1) by the
part from e2,i2 to t in Pi2 , and keep the part from s to e2,i2 in P (1) unchanged. Then we again construct
a new path P (2) from s to t, which doesn’t pass through CUT. Subsequently, note that the length of
the sub-path from s to e2,i2 of the path P (2) is strictly smaller than the length of the sub-path from s to
e1,i1 of the path P (1) because the latter covers the former and the network is acyclic.
By the same analysis as above, the path from s to e2,i2 in the path P (2) must pass through some
channel e1,i3 in CUT1 and e1,i3 ≻ e2,i3 . Replace the part from e1,i3 to t in P (2) by the part from e1,i3
to t in Pi3 and keep the part from s to e1,i3 in P (2) unchanged, which constitutes a new path P (3) from
s to t which doesn’t pass through CUT. Moreover, the length of the sub-path from s to e1,i3 in the path
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P (3) is strictly smaller than the length of the sub-path from s to e2,i2 in the path P (2). So far and so
forth, because the length of the sub-path from s to e1,i1 in the path P is finite, this process will stop
at some step. This implies that finally we find a path from s to t doesn’t pass through either CUT1 or
CUT2, which is a contradiction. Therefore, our hypothesis is not true, i.e., CUT is also a cut further a
minimum cut between s and t.
Proof of Theorem 3: Review the collection E˜cutr in (2) and the relation “mcut∼ ” from (3). We will
prove the transitivity of the relation “mcut∼ ”.
First, for any A ∈ E˜cutr , define MinCut(A) as the collection of all minimum cuts between s and A. Let
CUT1 be a common minimum cut of A and A′, i.e., CUT1 ∈ MinCut(A)∩MinCut(A′), and similarly
CUT2 be a common minimum cut of A′ and A′′, i.e., CUT2 ∈ MinCut(A′)∩MinCut(A′′). Further, by
Menger’s Theorem, we can find r edge-disjoint paths P1, P2, · · · , Pr from s to A′, and no other paths
from s to A′ exist provided deleting these r paths. Together with Lemma 4, these r paths pass through
all minimum cuts in MinCut(A′), and particularly, pass through CUT1 and CUT2. Subsequently, let
CUTj = {ej,i : 1 ≤ i ≤ r}, j = 1, 2, and let ej,i be on the path Pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r and j = 1, 2. Next,
define a new channel-set CUT:
CUT = {minord(e1,i, e2,i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ r}.
3
By Lemma 5, we know that CUT is still a minimum cut between s and A′, that is, CUT ∈MinCut(A′).
In the following, we will prove that CUT actually is a common minimum cut between s and both A
and A′′. In other words, CUT ∈ MinCut(A) ∩MinCut(A′′).
At first, we show CUT ∈ MinCut(A). Conversely, CUT /∈ MinCut(A). Then there still exists a path
PA from s to A after deleting all edges in CUT from G. Subsequently, this path PA must pass through
CUT1 since CUT1 is a minimum cut between s and A. Without loss of generality, assume that PA
passes through the edge e1,1 in CUT1. Then e1,1 ≻ e2,1 because e1,1 /∈ CUT and PA doesn’t passes
through CUT. Furthermore, since CUT1 is also a minimum cut separating s and A′, there is a path
from e1,1 to A′. Now, we can construct a path PA′ from s to A′ constituted by the part from s to e1,1 in
PA concatenated by the part from e1,1 to A′ in P1. Notice none of the two parts passing through CUT.
This means that PA′ doesn’t pass through CUT, conflicting with the fact that CUT is a minimum cut
separating s and A′. Thus, our hypothesis is not true and it follows CUT ∈ MinCut(A).
Similarly, we can also prove CUT ∈ MinCut(A′′). Combining the above, we obtain A mcut∼ A′′.
Therefore, we complete the proof of the transitivity.
3Actually, CUT is independent with the choice of the r paths from s to A′.
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Therefore, the relation “mcut∼ ” can give a partition of E˜cutr because of its equivalence property, and
the number of all equivalence classes induced by “mcut∼ ” forms a new lower bound on the size of the
required finite field for Construction, which is our main conclusion in this letter.
Theorem 6: A Fq-valued SLNC with rate ω and security-level r can be constructed provided that
the field size |Fq| is larger than or equal to the number of equivalence classes of E˜cutr induced by the
equivalence relation “mcut∼ ”.
In addition, Rouayheb et al. [3] modified the LIF algorithm, proposed by Jaggi et al. [6] for constructing
LNCs, to obtain a SLIF algorithm for constructing SLNCs. Although their construction is equivalent to
Cai and Yeung’s in [2], their bound on the required field size of a SLNC is smaller. To be specific, for
their SLIF algorithm, a SLNC with rate ω and security-level r can be constructed over the finite field Fq
of size q ≥
(
|E|−1
r−1
)
+ |T |, and further, combining the algorithm in [7], which uses the concept of encoding
edges, with their SLIF algorithm, the corresponding field size has to satisfy |Fq| = q ≥
(2C3
min
|T |2−1
r−1
)
+|T |,
which is independent to the number of channels in G. Actually, easily see that for almost all cases, our
bound in Theorem 6, the number of equivalence classes, is much smaller than Rouayheb et al.s’ two
bounds. Particularly, we can also apply the algorithm in [7] to construct an auxiliary network Gˆ from G
firstly, and then apply our analysis on Gˆ. Moreover, it is necessary to notice that the above latter bound
by Rouayheb et al. [3] is worse than the former one in many cases. In addition, motivated by Rouayheb
et al.s’ formulation, universal secure network coding based on packet transmission is discussed in [4].
Silva and Kschischang show that this universal property can be qualified only if the packet length m
must be larger than or equal to the capacity Cmin, and assume that the eavesdropper wiretaps r packets
transmitted on r channels for every wiretap. Actually, their crucial idea is to consider the secure linear
code at the source node over an extension field Fqm , and thus the condition (1) can be satisfied for all
possible r×n matrices F⊤A . Hence, it is conceivable that the required field size is larger than ours. Next,
we will give an example to compare our bounds with the existing results.
Example 1: We take the combination network G1 (see [8, p.26]) with parameters N = 8 and k = 6
as an example. To be specific, G1 has a single source s and N = 8 internal nodes, each of which is
connected from s by one and only one channel. Arbitrary k = 6 internal nodes are connective with
one and only one sink node, and so the number of sink nodes is |T | =
(
N
k
)
=
(8
6
)
= 28, the number
of internal nodes is |J | = 8, the number of channels is |E| = N + |T | · k = 8 + 28 × 6 = 176, and
evidently the minimum cut capacity Cmin between s and every sink is 6. The Figure 1 is an illustration
of a combination network with N = 3 and k = 2.
Let the information rate and the security-level be ω = 3 and r = 3, respectively. After a simple
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Fig. 1. Combination Network with N = 3, k = 2.
calculation, we have
(|E|
r
)
=
(176
3
)
= 893200. Subsequently, we analyze the cardinality of the collection
E˜cutr = E˜
cut
3 = {A ⊆ E : |A| = mincut(s,A) = 3}. We divide all channels in E into two layers: upper
layer and lower layer. The upper layer contains all channels between s and internal nodes, and thus there
are total 8 channels in this layer. The lower layer consists of all channels between internal nodes and
sink nodes, and total |T | · k = 28 × 6 = 168 channels in this layer. Next we will count the number of
channel-sets A in E˜cut3 .
• Case1. All three channels of A are from the upper layer. Then the number of such A in E˜cut3 is(
8
3
)
= 56.
• Case2. All three channels of A are from the lower layer. Notice that if three channels in the lower
layer achieve capacity 3, then they have to come from different internal nodes. Together with the
fact that the number of outgoing channels of every internal node is
(
N−1
k−1
)
=
(
7
5
)
= 21, the number
of such A in E˜cut3 is
(8
3
)(21
1
)(21
1
)(21
1
)
= 518616.
• Case3. Two channels of A are from the upper layer and the other one is from the lower layer. The
number of such A in E˜cut3 is
(
8
2
)(
6
1
)(
21
1
)
= 3528.
• Case4. Two channels of A are from the lower layer and the other one is from the upper layer. The
number of such A in E˜cut3 is
(8
1
)(7
2
)(21
1
)(21
1
)
= 74088.
Combining the above four cases, one obtains |E˜cut3 | = 596288, smaller than
(
|E|
r
)
= 893200.
Next, we focus on the number of equivalence classes in E˜cut3 under the relation “
mcut
∼ ”. It is easy to
deduce that any channel-set A in Cases 2, 3 and 4 must have a minimum cut in Case 1. Thus, the number
of the equivalence classes is
(8
3
)
= 56. This indicates that the required field size 56 is enough, which is
much smaller than
(
|E|
r
)
= 893200 and |E˜cutr | = 596288.
Further, for the two bounds on the required field size in [3], we calculate that (|E|−1
r−1
)
+ |T | = 15253
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and
(
2C3
min
|T |2−1
r−1
)
+ |T | > 5× 1010. Clearly, our new bound is also much smaller than them. In addition,
although the authors in [4] considered the packet network coding problem, and by contrast, we (also [2]
and [3]) studied scalar network coding problem, we compare our results with theirs. It is known that the
field size which can be chosen as the minimum required for multicasting is larger than or equal to the
number of sink nodes, i.e., |T | = 28 here, and further the minimum cut capacity Cmin between s and
each t ∈ T is 6. Thus, the field size as discussed in [4] for their universal secure scheme is at least 286,
also much larger than our result 56.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Cai and R. W. Yeung, “Secure network coding,” IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory, Lausanne, Switzerland, Jun. 30-Jul. 5,
2002.
[2] N. Cai and R. W. Yeung, “Secure Network Coding on a Wiretap Network,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 1, pp.
424-435, Jan. 2011.
[3] S. El Rouayheb, E. Soljanin, and A. Sprintson, “Secure Network Coding for Wiretap Networks of Type II,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1361-1371, March 2012.
[4] D. Silva and F. R. Kschischang, “Universal secure network coding via rank-metric codes,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol.
57, no. 2, pp. 1124-1135, Feb. 2011.
[5] J. Feldman, T. Malkin, R. A. Servedio, and C. Stein, “On the capacity of secure network coding,” 42nd Ann. Allerton Conf.
Commun., Contr., Comput., Monticello, IL, Sep. 29-Oct. 1, 2004.
[6] S. Jaggi, P. Sanders, P. A. Chou, M. Effros, S. Egner, K. Jain, and L. M. G. M. Tolhuizen, “Polynomial time algorithms
for multicast network code construction,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 1973-1982, Jun. 2005.
[7] M. Langberg, A. Sprintson, and J. Bruck, “Network coding: A computational perspective,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
55, no. 1, pp. 147-157, Jan. 2009.
[8] R. W. Yeung, S.-Y. R. Li, N. Cai, and Z. Zhang, “Network coding theory,” Foundations and Trends in Communications and
Information Theory, vol. 2, nos.4 and 5, pp. 241-381, 2005.
August 14, 2018 DRAFT
